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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the bank-led rescues of ￿nancially dis-
tressed ￿rms in the heyday of the main bank system was ine¢ cient
since banks￿implicit guarantee against bankruptcy resulted in moral
hazard. The empirical results show that during the period before the
￿nancial deregulation of the 1980s main bank client ￿rms retrenched
operational expenses and improved corporate performance signi￿cantly
less than the ￿rms without close bank ties after the onset of ￿nancial
distress. This evidence suggests that managers of bank-a¢ liated ￿rms
tended to do away with sharp downsizing by relying on ￿nancial sup-
port from their main bank.
￿Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research. Email: iwatsubo@ier.hit-
u.ac.jp
yI am grateful to helpful comments by Kaku Furuya, Akiyoshi Horiuchi, Masaharu
Hanazaki, Hideshi Itoh, Matthias Kahl, Masaaki Kato, Makoto Nirei, Seki Obata, Makoto
Saito, Juro Teranishi, Aaron Tornell and seminar participants at Hitotsubashi, Daito-
Bunka, and the Japan Economic Association Fall 2003 Meeting. All errors are my own.
11 Introduction
While corporate governance in the U.S. is market-oriented, that in Japan
is generally characterized as a stable, relationship-based system. Many be-
lieve that Japanese banks have played an important role in monitoring and
disciplining managers of their client ￿rms through a long-term link, the so-
called "main bank relationship". The prolonged stagnation for more than a
decade, however, questions the e⁄ectiveness of the main bank system since
its role of monitoring client ￿rms seems incompatible with today￿ s serious
non-performing loan problems. In response to this challenge, some profes-
sionals have argued that the recent poor corporate governance by Japanese
banks was a consequence of the ￿nancial deregulation since the 1980s, which
lowered rent opportunities of banks and thereby discouraged them from
monitoring their client ￿rms prudently (Aoki (1994), Hoshi and Kashyap
(2001)).1
The conventional view with regard to corporate governance in Japan
is the "state-contingent governance" theory (Aoki (1988)). In normal or
favorable ￿nancial states, the governance structure of top management is
entirely controlled by the body of permanent employees even though its
main bank monitors the ￿rm management. Once the ￿rm is involved in
￿nancial distress, the main bank intervenes in the corporate management
and provides special ￿nancial assistance to improve operating performance.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990b) argue that the bank interventions
rescue ￿rms from costly ￿nancial distress. They show evidence that main
bank client ￿rms invest and sell more after the onset of ￿nancial distress
than the ￿rms without close bank ties.
However, are bank-led rescues of distress ￿rms always e¢ cient? When
main banks bail out and monitor client ￿rms, can they recover from ￿nancial
distress more quickly than the ￿rms without close bank ties? In other words,
do strong bank ties lead ￿rm managers to work less vigorously than if they
had to deal with arm￿ s length creditors? To our knowledge, no systematic
studies exist that investigate whether the bank-led rescues of ￿rms are e¢ -
cient or not. This paper ￿lls the gap by focusing on corporate restructuring
of the ￿rms in ￿nancial distress.
To the extent that corporate restructuring leads to improvement in op-
1It should be noted that some scholars have already cast doubt on the monitoring
role of main banks. Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000) argue that ￿nancial deregulation was
gradually and cautiously proceeded so as not to a⁄ect the pro￿tability of banks. They also
document that the decline in bank dependency by large ￿rms started in the late 1970s,
before the onset of ￿nancial deregulation.
2erating performance, one might expect the e⁄ective corporate governance
implies that main banks urge ￿nancially distressed ￿rms to engage in re-
structuring for more e¢ cient management. Contrary to this, we discover
that main bank client ￿rms in ￿nancial distress retrenched signi￿cantly less
than the ￿rms without close bank ties during the period before the ￿nancial
deregulation of the 1980s. We also ￿nd that the corporate performance of
the main bank client ￿rms improved markedly less after the onset of distress
than the downsizing independent ￿rms. Based on the above evidence, we
argue that managers of main bank client ￿rms tended to do away with down-
sizing by relying on ￿nancial support from their main bank. The bank-led
rescues of distressed ￿rms in the heyday of the main bank system might be
ine¢ cient due to the implicit guarantee against bankruptcy.
Furthermore, we document that such di⁄erences in retrenchment and
performance recovery after the onset of ￿nancial distress between main bank
clients and independent ￿rms disappeared in the 1990s. We interpret this
￿nding as evidence that main bank client ￿rms no longer believed in the
implicit bail-out guarantee, partly because main banks could not a⁄ord to
commit themselves to prop up client ￿rms.
We then examine whether the decisions of corporate restructuring are
in￿ uenced by capital and ownership structure. We ￿nd that the bank loan
ratio and the bank ownership share are negatively correlated with cost re-
ductions and subsequent improvement in performance, which is consistent
with our moral hazard hypothesis. In contrast, corporate restructuring and
quick recovery of performance are more likely when the foreign ownership
share is high. In spite of being small shareholders, foreign investors appear
to play a more signi￿cant role in the management of ￿nancially distressed
￿rms than the silent majority of large investors that have long-term relation-
ships with the ￿rms, such as ￿nancial institutions and domestic corporate
shareholders, in the 1990s.
Section 2 of this paper reviews previous studies on corporate governance
in Japan. Section 3 and 4 describe the data and empirical results, respec-
tively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Prior Research on Corporate Governance in Japan
2.1 The Main Bank System
One of the distinctive institutional features of corporate governance in Japan
is the main bank system. Traditionally, a number of ￿rms have maintained
a close relationship with a particular bank, known as "main bank", which
3holds the largest block of equity (at least among banks) and is a major
lender.2 The alleged role of main banks is to monitor ￿rm management, to
extend various types of ￿nancial assistance in ￿nancial distress, to dispatch
a management team if necessary, to restructure ￿rm organizations in bad
situations, and to allow the ￿rm to go bankrupt in the worst situations.
The cornerstone of the main bank system is the information-sharing rela-
tionship between the bank and its client ￿rm. The close association between
the main bank and the ￿rm allows the bank to obtain information about
the internal decision making of the ￿rm which is not readily available, or
available only at high cost, to the external capital market (Sheard (1989)).
In this context, a long-term main bank relationship is regarded as an institu-
tion that mitigates the problem of asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers.
Diamond (1984) shows that delegating the task of monitoring to a ￿nan-
cial intermediary minimizes monitoring costs, while issuing securities like
public debt and equity may be ine¢ cient either because monitoring costs
are needlessly duplicated among individual security holders or because mon-
itoring is a public good that no one has an incentive to provide (free-rider
problems).3 Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990a, 1991) present evidence
that ￿rms with closer ties with main banks are less liquidity constrained
in their investment decision than independent ￿rms.4 They conclude that
since main banks acquire inside knowledge of ￿rm￿ s investment opportuni-
ties, they facilitate smoother investment by freeing client ￿rms from reliance
on internal funds.
2The Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law allows banks to hold up to 5% of a ￿rm￿ s stock
(10% prior to 1987), but banks can exert more control over the ￿rm by mobilizing the
shareholding of the group￿ s trust bank, insurance company, trading company and other
member ￿rms. It is argued that these shareholdings deter potential hostile takeover bids.
3As Sheard (1989) argues, the sense in which the main bank represents a delegated
monitor is slightly di⁄erent from the sense in which Diamond (1984) uses the term. In
Diamond￿ s model, monitoring is delegated from depositors to an intermediary, whereas
the main bank system can be characterized in terms of banks themselves delegating the
monitoring of a particular ￿rm to one particular bank (the main bank). Thus, in Japan
the main bank may be the only bank that monitors the ￿rm, but it is not the only bank
which lends to the ￿rm.
4Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and others, Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1990a, 1991) use investment-cash ￿ ow sensitivity as an indicator of liquidity
constraint. Several recent papers, however, question the validity of this approach. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) reexamine the "constrained" ￿rm group used in the study of Fazzari,
Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and show that sensitivity is the highest for those ￿rms that
are deemed unconstrained. Gomes (2001) theoretically shows signi￿cant cash ￿ ow e⁄ects
even in the absence of ￿nancial frictions.
4However, some scholars were reluctant to fully embrace the bene￿cial
monitoring view of main banks even before the ￿nancial deregulation of the
1980s.5 Caves and Uekusa (1976), Nakatani (1984) and Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998) all show that bank-a¢ liated ￿rms performed worse than independent
￿rms on a variety of measures of pro￿tability, suggesting that the bene￿ts of
bank relationship is not internalized by the ￿rm. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)
￿nd that main banks charge their client ￿rms higher interest rates than ￿rms
with weak bank ties. They argue that these high debt costs re￿ ect that
banks are able to extract rents from their client ￿rms in return for providing
capital and other services. On the other hand, Aoki (1988) attributes the
costs to an "agency fee" paid by individual shareholders for bank monitoring.
Another possibility may be that it is a "bankruptcy insurance premium".
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b) stress the role of main banks to
provide special assistance for their client ￿rms in ￿nancial distress.6 These
assistance packages typically involve the provision of emergency ￿nance in
the ￿rst instance and then reductions or exemptions of interest payments
(Kawai, Hashimoto and Izumida (1996)).7
Another vital way of main banks to bail out client ￿rms is to dispatch
managers to the client ￿rms in ￿nancial distress. Kaplan and Minton (1994)
report that bank director appointments are more likely when ￿rms perform
poorly and that such bank appointments are associated with a higher like-
lihood of CEO turnover and improved subsequent ￿rm performance. Kang
and Shivdasani (1995) ￿nd that poorly performing CEOs are more likely
to be replaced when ￿rms have strong main bank ties. Morck and Naka-
mura (1999) document that bank director appointments play di⁄erent roles
for group ￿rms and outside group ￿rms. For non-group ￿rms, banks act
as creditors to rescue their client ￿rms from poor current liquidity. On the
other hand, for group ￿rms, banks act in the broader interests of stakehold-
ers, including shareholders.
The above arguments indicate that the costs and bene￿ts of main bank
governance hinge, in large part, upon the e¢ ciency of bank-led rescues of
￿nancially distressed ￿rms. In this paper, we examine how main bank client
5Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that close bank ties may be costly for client
￿rms, as information monopolies or market power allow banks to extract rents.
6However, Hall and Weinstein (2000) ￿nd that ￿rms without main bank ties receive as
much loan assistance (from the top lending bank and from all bank lenders) as ￿rms with
ties to main banks.
7Fukao (1999) reports that the survey conducted in 1992 by Fuji Research Institute
reveals that a number of ￿rms expect emergency assistance from their main banks when
they become ￿nancially distressed, in return for the long-term close ties with their main
bank.
5￿rms respond to ￿nancial distress in comparison with the ￿rms without close
bank ties.
2.2 Corporate Restructuring and Governance
When ￿rms are involved in ￿nancial distress, they try to avoid bankruptcy by
restructuring their assets and liabilities. Asset sales, mergers, capital expen-
diture reductions, and layo⁄s (on asset side), and restructuring of bank debt
and public debt (on liability side) are common responses to distress (Asquith,
Gertner and Scharfstein (1994)). Moreover, some evidence shows that cor-
porate performance signi￿cantly improves following downsizing (John and
Ofek (1995), Espahbodi, John and Vasudevan (2000)).
It is sometimes argued in Japan, however, that the traditional Japanese
management system (e.g., seniority ranking and lifetime employment) is
incompatible with the U.S.-style corporate restructuring. As opposed to
this, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) ￿nd that the responses of Japanese ￿rms to
a substantial decline in their operating performance are surprisingly similar
to the U.S. ￿rms in many respects, such as selling assets, closing plants,
reducing capital expenditures and production, and through employee layo⁄s,
although the frequency is lower than that of the U.S. counterparts.
Kang and Shivdasani (1997) report that the likelihood of asset down-
sizing and layo⁄s in Japanese ￿rms increases with the ownership by the
￿rms￿main bank and other blockholders. They also ￿nd that the owner-
ship by blockholders increases the probability of management turnover and
outsider director additions, but reduces the likelihood of acquisitions. Our
paper is di⁄erent from Kang and Shivdasani (1997) in that they measure the
frequency of corporate restructuring, while we examine its magnitude and
speed. We also focus on the di⁄erence in response to performance declines
between the ￿rms with and without close bank ties, to which they do not
pay attention.
Morck and Nakamura (1999) document that bank group ￿rms￿entertain-
ment spending rises at uniformly higher rates following bank appointments
than nongroup ￿rms￿ , although the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant.
The present paper looks at various measures of corporate restructuring fol-
lowing ￿nancial distress. It also identi￿es ￿nancial and ownership factors
that could a⁄ect corporate restructuring and subsequent improvement in
performance.
63 Data
We use ￿nancial data on all manufacturing ￿rms listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange that are obtained from the Japan Development Bank data base.
We ￿rst identify a set of ￿rms that su⁄ered ￿nancial distress. Among the
many possible de￿nitions of ￿nancial distress, following John, Lang and Net-
ter (1992), we choose one that selects ￿rms experiencing negative ordinary
income (operating income net of non-operating pro￿ts) for two consecutive
years followed by three years of positive ordinary income.8 As a convention,
we denote the ￿rst year in which the ordinary income is negative as period
t. Thus, for example, period t-1 refers to the year of healthy performance
preceding two years of ￿nancial distress and period t+3 is the second year
of positive pro￿ts following the spell of ￿nancial distress.
We adopt this de￿nition for the following reasons. First, selecting ￿rms
with two years of poor performance ensures identi￿cation of responses to
short-term ￿nancial distress, making it possible to evaluate the speed and
the magnitude with which a ￿rm reacts to a decline in value. As Kawai,
Hashimoto and Izumida (1996) describe in detail, the consecutive years of
negative pro￿ts usually arouse concerns with the ￿rm￿ s management and
may invite some form of bank intervention since banks tend to view them as
a re￿ ection of something fundamentally wrong with the ￿rm￿ s management
and operation rather than a temporary adverse shock to the ￿rm.
Second, using a short period of poor performance avoids bringing into our
sample ￿rms continuing poor performance to which they did not react. The
data reveal that ￿rms do not always return to consecutive years of positive
pro￿ts following consecutive years of negative pro￿ts; they often sink into
consecutive negative pro￿ts for a year or even several years after having
brie￿ y returned to positive pro￿ts. We assume that these long distressed
￿rms can continue their business due to the continuous ￿nancial support
from their main banks. Hence, excluding these ￿rms from our sample does
not necessarily bias our conclusion.
We examine two distinct sample periods to see whether the role of main
banks changed following the ￿nancial deregulation. The ￿rst sample period
8Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990b) use an alternative de￿nition of ￿nancial dis-
tress, which is the two consecutive years of less than one coverage ratio (the ratio of
operating income to interest payments). A close investigation of the ￿nancial data reveals
that when Japanese large ￿rms have less than one coverage ratio, they usually try to sell
￿xed property (e.g. real estate and ￿nancial assets) to make their ordinary pro￿t positive.
These large ￿rms do not respond promptly to their poor performance. Hence, we do not
follow their de￿nition in this paper.
7in which ￿rms could enter our sample begins in April 1978 and ends in March
1985, while the second period begins in April 1990 and ends in March 1997.
For most ￿rms, the ￿scal year runs from April 1 to the following March
31. We correspond our ￿rst sample period to that of Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1990b) and de￿ne it as the pre-deregulation period. This is
because Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a) identify 1983 as the year
in which the ￿nancial deregulation virtually started in Japan. We name
our second sample period the post-deregulation period. The second sample
period is chosen so that we can include the most recent and available data.
We identify 72 ￿rms in the pre-deregulation period and 112 ￿rms in the
post-deregulation period matching our criteria.
The next step in forming the data is to identify which ￿rms had close
ties to main banks. As Aoki, Patrick and Sheard (1994), and Hall and
Weinstein (2000) argue, any de￿nition of main bank contains noise which
decreases the power of econometric tests. For example, de￿nitions based
on a¢ liation with an industrial group seem to be excessively strict, because
some una¢ liated ￿rms have long-term ties with banks. De￿nitions based
on bank lending behavior are sometimes inappropriate because many ￿rms
go through periods without any borrowing from banks. In this paper, we
choose the latter de￿nition since almost all ￿nancially distressed ￿rms bor-
row from banks. Here, the main bank client ￿rms are de￿ned if their largest
commercial bank lender does not change for ￿ve years prior to the beginning
of ￿nancial distress and during the period of ￿nancial distress. On the other
hand, if the largest bank lender changes at least once over the same period,
we regard the ￿rm as an independent. Ultimately, we have 42 main bank
client ￿rms out of 72 ￿rms in the pre-deregulation period and 47 main bank
clients out of 112 ￿rms in the post-deregulation period.
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics for ￿nancially distressed ￿rms in
our sample. In this paper, we assume that the following factors could a⁄ect
corporate restructuring and subsequent performance recovery: a main bank
dummy, bank loan ratios, leverage ratios, bank ownership, the ownership by
large shareholders, and foreign ownership. Out of the 72 ￿rms for the pre-
deregulation period, 58.3% are ￿rms with close ties to their main bank, while
41.9% are main bank clients out of the 112 ￿rms for the post-deregulation
period. This partially re￿ ects the decline in dependency for ￿nancing on
banks by large ￿rms in Japan.
Declines in bank loan ratios (the bank loans as a share of debt) and lever-
age ratios (the debt as a share of total asset) also indicate the trend of the
decline in bank dependency. On the other hand, foreign ownership slightly
increased in our sample. In fact, the foreign ownership as a percentage of
8market value has increased substantially during the 1990s.
Looking at the correlations among capital structure measures and equity
ownership shares for the two sample periods (Table 2), we ￿nd positive and
high correlations between bank loan ratios and bank ownership shares in
the pre-deregulation period, but they turn out to be negative in the post-
deregulation period. This suggests that even after large ￿rms lowered their
bank dependency, banks may have kept a signi￿cant in￿ uence on their client
￿rms as shareholders.
Bank ownership and large shareholder are negatively correlated. We
interpret this as evidence that large shareholders are dominated by non-
￿nancial corporate shareholders.
Lastly, as opposed to our intuition, the correlations between main bank
dummy and bank loan ratio are low. This suggests that main bank client
￿rms do not necessarily have high bank loan ratios relative to the ￿rms
without close bank ties.
4 Empirical Results
The primary objective of this paper is to empirically investigate whether
main banks urge client ￿rms in ￿nancial distress to engage in corporate
restructuring to recover their operating performance. We also examine
whether capital and ownership structure a⁄ect corporate restructuring and
subsequent performance recovery. Before examining whether there is any
di⁄erence in corporate restructuring between main bank client ￿rms and
independent ￿rms, we test whether corporate restructuring contributes to
improvement in performance.
4.1 E⁄ect of Restructuring on Performance Recovery
Here, we test to identify factors that can improve the operating performance
of ￿nancially distressed ￿rms. We do this by regressing the changes in
operating performance on several measures of corporate restructuring. The
dependent variable is the changes in ordinary income as a percentage of the
lagged assets. We measure the changes in the dependent and independent
variables relative to the ￿rst year of negative pro￿t.
The ￿rst independent variable is the percentage change in assets. John
and Ofek (1995) argue that the sale of assets leads to improvement in per-
formance through an increase in a ￿rm￿ s focus. On the contrary, as Jensen
(1986) suggested, expansion of assets that represents diversi￿cation strate-
gies or results in a loss of focus can be detrimental to ￿rm value. Nev-
9ertheless, a substantial investment in the core business, especially when
accompanied by reducing the number of segments, could also result in im-
provement in performance due to economies of scale. Hence, we do not make
any predictions regarding the coe¢ cient of this variable.
The second and third variables are the percentage change in the number
of employees and the change in labor cost as a percentage of sales, respec-
tively. Layo⁄s of employees, reductions in compensations or bonuses, and
other actions are likely to occur so that ￿rms would downsize, or adopt
more e¢ cient or capital intensive production techniques. These should lead
to improvement in performance. However, large cuts in employees can de-
moralize the survivors and lead to losses in productivity (Brockner (1988)).
This could hamper or even reverse the e⁄ect of cost savings. These variables
also could have ambiguous e⁄ects on performance recovery.
The last variable we use is the change in operating expenses as a per-
centage of sales.9 This is a typical measure for the e¢ ciency of the cost
structure of ￿rms. In general, ￿rms with low cost structure generate more
pro￿ts than those with high cost structure. Hence, we expect a positive
coe¢ cient for this variable.
We conduct this analysis using a median regression estimator due to
the skewness of accounting data and the existence of extreme observations
(Kaplan (1989), Jain and Kini (1994)). Some distressed ￿rms are involved
in major restructuring through asset sales, spin-o⁄s, and mergers. Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b) exclude these ￿rms from their sample since
they are unable to measure the ￿rms￿investment. However, this introduces
the possibility of selection bias in their sample. We do not omit them;
instead, we use the median regression and avoid the possibility of estimation
bias due to the extreme observations.
Table 3 reports the results of our analysis. We conduct the same regres-
sions for both pre- and post-deregulation periods to see the di⁄erence in the
e⁄ect of corporate restructuring on improvement in performance between the
two periods. In the equation 1, we regress the change in ordinary income as
a percentage of the lagged assets over the period from t to t+2 against the
changes in measures of corporate restructuring from t to t+1. The coe¢ -
cient of the change in assets is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level, which
is consistent with related work by Espahbodi, John and Vasudevan (2000).
This suggests that ￿rms that increased their asset base had improvement
in performance. The coe¢ cients of the changes in the number of employees
9"Operating expenses" refer to the selling and general administrative expenses in the
Japanese accounting terms.
10and labor cost are both negative, although the coe¢ cient of employees is not
signi￿cant. Firms that were able to reduce costs by reducing the number of
employees and/or compensations improved performance. The coe¢ cient of
the change in operating expenses is also negative and signi￿cant at the 5%
level. Firms that succeed in cutting down on operating expenses have larger
improvement in performance.
In the equation 2, we conduct the regression when the dependent variable
is taken over the period from t to t+3 and the independent variables from
t to t+2. The results are similar to those of the equation 1 except that
the coe¢ cient of the change in assets is not signi￿cant. The coe¢ cients
of the changes in labor cost and operating expenses are both negative and
signi￿cant.
The equations 3 and 4 have the same speci￿cations as the equations 1
and 2, but use observations for the post-deregulation period. Interestingly,
the results are quite similar to those for the pre-deregulation period. The
coe¢ cients of the change in assets are positive and the coe¢ cients of the
other three variables are negative for the two equations. Overall, our results
suggest that corporate restructuring tends to be more successful for the ￿rms
that cut down on labor cost and operating expenses.
4.2 Main Bank Client Firms versus Independent Firms
In this section, we compare the operating performance, corporate size, and
the certain elements of costs between main bank client ￿rms and independent
￿rms.
Table 4-1 through 4-5 shows our analysis. We present results and signif-
icance levels for both medians and means, but we base our analysis on me-
dians. This is common practice for the same reasons described above. For
medians, we base signi￿cance levels on non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. For means, we report parametric t￿tests. Barber and Lyon
(1996) demonstrate that because extreme observations exist, non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank test are uniformly more powerful than parametric
t￿tests. We report both test statistics for completeness, but emphasize the
nonparametric tests. Furthermore, we conduct Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to
examine whether the di⁄erence in median of our measures between main
bank client ￿rms and independent ￿rms is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
We conduct the same analysis using industry-adjusted data and obtain the
similar results. Since we are interested in the absolute changes in these
variables, we do not report the industry-adjusted results.
Table 4-1 reports the changes in operating performance for all ￿rms,
11main bank client ￿rms and independent ￿rms over the periods before and
after the ￿nancial deregulation. All variables are measured relative to the
￿rst year of negative pro￿t (period t). Panel A shows that following the
￿nancial distress the median of operating performance for all ￿rms steadily
increases in the pre-deregulation period. The performance changes from t
to t+2 and from t to t+4 are 3.9% and 6.0%, respectively. While both main
bank client ￿rms and independent ￿rms had improvement in performance
following ￿nancial distress, the median changes in operating performance are
signi￿cantly higher for independent ￿rms than for main bank ￿rms. On the
other hand, the standard deviation of the changes in operating performance
for independent ￿rms is more than that for main bank client ￿rms. Panel B
reports the changes in operating performance in the post-deregulation pe-
riod. From t to t+2, the changes in operating performance are higher for
main bank clients than those for independents although they are not signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent. Independent ￿rms had larger improvement in performance
from t to t+3 and from t to t+4 than main bank client ￿rms.
In sum, independent ￿rms generally outperformed main bank client ￿rms
after the onset of ￿nancial distress. This result seems contradictory to the
￿ndings of Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b) that main bank client
￿rms invest and sell more than independent ￿rms during the same period.
We show below that the main reason for this discrepancy is that independent
￿rms curtail their operational costs more than main bank client ￿rms.
We then examine the median changes in ￿rm size and certain elements
of costs that could a⁄ect improvement in performance. Table 4-2 reports
the percentage changes in assets for all ￿rms, main bank client ￿rms, and
independent ￿rms. The period covers from the ￿rst year of negative pro￿ts
(period t) to three years from that year. Panel A shows that for all ￿rms,
there is a slight decline in assets from t to t+1 (median -1.0%) followed by
a slight recovery from t+1 to t+2 (median 1.8%) and a signi￿cant increase
from t+2 to t+3 (median 3.0%). Over the period from t to t+3 the median
assets increase by 4.8%, but this increase is insigni￿cant according to the
signed-rank test. Although the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant, independent
￿rms grow at higher rates than main bank client ￿rms after the onset of
￿nancial distress. On the other hand, the standard deviation of the growth
rate of assets for independent ￿rms is always higher than that for main bank
￿rms, which is similar to the above results with respect to the operating
performance.
Panel B reports the results from the same analysis for the post-deregulation
period. Assets decrease substantially from t to t+1 (median -3.6%) and from
t+1 to t+2 (median -2.0%), thereafter increase slightly from t+2 to t+3 (me-
12dian 0.4%). It follows from this that ￿rms downsize their assets in response
to poor performance in the post-deregulation period more than in the pre-
deregulation period. In contrast to the result for the pre-deregulation period,
independent ￿rms downsize their assets more than main bank client ￿rms
in the post-deregulation period, although the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant.
Table 4-3 and 4-4 report the percentage changes in employees and the
changes in labor cost as a percentage of sales, respectively. Panels A of Ta-
ble 4-3 and 4-4 show that ￿nancially distressed ￿rms experience substantial
layo⁄s and labor cost reductions in the pre-deregulation period. Employ-
ment falls signi￿cantly from t to t+1 (median -4.5%) and from t+1 to t+2
(median -4.2%), and thereafter increases slightly from t+2 to t+3 (median
0.7%). The labor cost over sales also declines over the entire period: from t
to t+1 (median -0.4%), from t+1 to t+2 (median -0.7%) and from t+2 to
t+3 (median -0.2%). Our striking result is that independent ￿rms curtail
labor cost by reducing employees and/or compensations more than main
bank client ￿rms in the pre-deregulation period. The Wilcoxon rank-sum
test indicates that the di⁄erence in median labor cost between main bank
client ￿rms and independent ￿rms is signi￿cant over the period from t to
t+3.
On the contrary, Panels B of Table 4-3 and 4-4 show that there is no
such substantial di⁄erence in layo⁄s and retrenchment between main bank
clients and independents for the post-deregulation period. Just after the
onset of ￿nancial distress (from t to t+1), independent ￿rms cut down on
labor cost and lay o⁄ employees more than main bank ￿rms; while during
the period from t+1 to t+2, main banks reduce employees and labor cost
more than independent ￿rms. The evidence that independent ￿rms retrench
more than main bank client ￿rms is no longer seen in the post-deregulation
period.
Table 4-5 reports the changes in operating expenses as a percentage of
sales. Similar to the results obtained above, Panel A shows that indepen-
dent ￿rms retrench operating expenses signi￿cantly more than main bank
￿rms for two and three years after the onset of ￿nancial distress in the
pre-deregulation period. Moreover, Panel B of Table 4-5 indicates that this
di⁄erence in median operating expenses between main bank client ￿rms and
independent ￿rms is still signi￿cant in the post-deregulation period as well.
4.3 E⁄ect of Capital and Ownership Structure
In the previous section, we ￿nd that independent ￿rms had larger improve-
ment in performance and larger reductions in labor cost and operating ex-
13penses than main bank client ￿rms during and after ￿nancial distress, es-
pecially for the pre-deregulation period. However, close bank ties are not
the only di⁄erence in the ￿nancial structure that could a⁄ect their ability to
work out of distress. To address this issue, we conduct regression analyses to
control for other factors that could a⁄ect corporate restructuring and sub-
sequent operating performance. Speci￿cally, we include several measures of
the capital and ownership structure in the dependent variables of our regres-
sions to examine corporate governance mechanisms for ￿nancially distressed
￿rms.10
The ￿rst independent variable is the main bank dummy that equals
to one if a particular ￿rm is a main bank client ￿rm and zero otherwise.
The second variable is the bank loan ratio (bank loans over debt). As
discussed earlier, the conventional view stresses that the close bank ties
enable main banks to engage in stringent monitoring for client ￿rms and
promote e¢ cient management of the ￿rms. Here, however, we argue that
the close bank ties, when accompanied by the bail-out guarantee, generate
the moral hazard problem which discourages ￿rm managers from reducing
operational expenses and disturbs quick recovery of corporate performance.
We expect negative e⁄ects of these variables on corporate restructuring and
performance.
The third variable is the leverage ratio (the ratio of debt to assets).
Debt can have both positive and negative e⁄ects on corporate restructuring
and ￿rm value. Myers (1977) demonstrates that ￿ too much￿debt induces
￿rm managers acting in the interests of shareholders to forego positive net
present value projections (the underinvestment problem).11 On the other
hand, the overinvestment problem, maintained by Jensen (1986), can be
curtailed if managers are forced to put our excess funds to serve debt. With
regard to the e⁄ect of debt on corporate restructuring, Jensen (1989) argues
that highly-leveraged ￿rms respond quickly to the performance declines in
order to prevent default. On the contrary, if most of debt comprises bank
loans, the positive e⁄ect of debt on restructuring may be o⁄set by the moral
hazard e⁄ect due to the ever-lasting support by banks. Hence, we do not
make any predictions on the coe¢ cient of this variable.
The fourth through sixth independent variables are measures of own-
ership structure: the equity ownership shares by banks, large shareholders
10We do not examine the e⁄ect of managerial ownership since there are no ￿rms with
managerial stock ownership in the pre-deregulation period and very few ￿rms in the post-
deregulation period in our sample.
11The underinvestment problem can be mitigated, however, if main banks, as equity
holders of their client ￿rms, re￿nance the debt.
14and foreign investors. Bank ownership is generally regarded as a measure
of close bank ties. According to the conventional view, the simultaneous
ownership of debt and equity claims by banks can be bene￿cial for client
￿rms if it alleviates potential con￿ icts of interests between creditors and
equity holders, thereby improving ￿rm value (Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Myers (1977), Stultz (1988)). However, we regard the close bank ties as a
device to discourage ￿rm managers from having su¢ cient budget cuts and
hamper improvement in performance. Hence, we expect a negative e⁄ect of
this variable on corporate performance and restructuring.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that since large shareholders are able
to govern by exercising their voting rights, generally they have incentives to
monitor management to enhance ￿rm value. It is argued, however, that the
cross-shareholdings among companies, banks and other ￿nancial institutions
in Japan may not have functioned to induce large shareholders to play such a
disciplinary role. Nakatani (1984) describes the corporate group and related
cross-shareholdings as a shock-absorbing, "mutual insurance" arrangement
in which ￿rms can maintain more stable corporate performance over time
rather than higher pro￿tability. Most CEOs have placed shareholders in
importance after employees, customers and banks for a long time. Hence,
we expect a negative e⁄ect of this variable on corporate restructuring and
performance.
The literature on corporate governance has not so far explored the e⁄ect
of foreign ownership on corporate restructuring and performance. In spite
of being small shareholders, foreign investors may have a considerable in￿ u-
ence on the decisions of corporate restructuring since they demand to have
a return on their investment more than the silent majority of large share-
holders that have long-term relationships with the ￿rms. Hence, we expect
a positive e⁄ect of this variable on corporate restructuring and performance.
Table 5-1 reports a series of regressions where the dependent variable is
the changes in operating performance. In the equations 5 and 6, we regress
changes in operating performance over the periods from t to t+2 and t to t+3
against the measures of the capital and ownership structure at t-1 for the
pre-deregulation period. We use the variables at the time before the onset
of distress (period t-1) as independent variables to avoid the simultaneity
problem. The only variable that enters the regressions signi￿cantly is the
main bank dummy. This suggests that main bank client ￿rms improve their
operating performance signi￿cantly less than independent ￿rms in the pre-
deregulation period. In contrast, the equations 7 and 8 show that the main
bank dummy is not signi￿cant for the post-deregulation period and the signs
of the coe¢ cients are not stable.
15The regression results for the post-deregulation period (equations 7 and
8) also reveal the positive and signi￿cant relation between the foreign owner-
ship share and the change in operating performance. The main bank dummy
is no longer signi￿cant for the post-deregulaion period. The coe¢ cients of
the bank ownership share and the ownership by large shareholders are neg-
ative and signi￿cant in the equation 8. These results apparently contradict
the conventional view that close bank ties and large shareholders contribute
to e¢ cient management. Rather, they seem consistent with our hypothesis
that ￿rm managers shirk to downsize ￿rm organizations and reduce oper-
ational costs by relying on the ￿nancial support from banks and on the
infeasibility of takeovers and public protests for control due to the mutual
shareholding among corporations.
We then test whether close bank ties and large shareholder ownership
interfere with corporate restructuring. We restrict our regressions to those in
which dependent variables are the changes in labor cost and the changes in
operating expenses because, as in Table 3, these cost reductions signi￿cantly
contribute to improvement in performance. Table 5-2 reports the regression
results where the dependent variable is the changes in labor cost. The
equations 9 and 10 show that the main bank dummy and the bank loan
ratio is positively related to the changes in labor cost in the pre-deregulation
period. In contrast, in the equation 11 for the post-deregulation period,
the coe¢ cient of the main bank dummy is not signi￿cant, while that of
foreign ownership is negative and signi￿cant at 10% level. The coe¢ cients
of the bank ownership share and the ownership share by large shareholders
are positive and signi￿cant in the equation 12. These results suggest that
close bank ties, represented by bank-related variables, and the corporate
shareholdings, measured by large shareholder ownership, discourage ￿rms
from cutting down on labor cost.
Table 5-3 reports the result from the regressions where the dependent
variable is the changes in operating expenses. Similar to the results in
Table 5-2, the equation 13 shows the changes in operating expenses are
positively related to the main bank dummy and the bank loan ratio for the
pre-deregulation period. Moreover, the coe¢ cients of the main bank dummy
and the leverage ratio are positive and signi￿cant for the post-deregulation
period, as the equation 15 shows. The foreign ownership share is negatively
correlated with the changes in operating expenses for the post-deregulation
period in both equations 15 and 16.
So far we have seen that main bank client ￿rms cut down on operational
cost and improved corporate performance signi￿cantly less than the ￿rms
without close bank ties in the pre-deregulation period, while the di⁄erence
16between the two groups almost disappeared in the post-deregulation period.
The former ￿nding is consistent with our moral hazard hypothesis. With
regard to the latter ￿nding, the main reason may be that main bank client
￿rms no longer believed in the implicit bail-out guarantee, partly because
their main banks could not a⁄ord to commit themselves to prop up client
￿rms.
Overall, the bank-related variables, such as the bank loan ratios and the
bank ownership share, have negative e⁄ects on cost reductions and subse-
quent improvement of performance. In contrast, the high foreign ownership
share led ￿rm managers to curtail operational costs and achieve quick re-
covery of performance in the 1990s.
Another striking result from these regressions is a sharp contrast in the
e⁄ect of equity ownership on corporate restructuring and performance be-
tween the pre- and the post-deregulation periods. Since the 1990s, the distri-
bution of equity claims has played a signi￿cant role on corporate governance
for the ￿rms in ￿nancial distress.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that the bank-led rescues of distressed ￿rms in the
heyday of the main bank system was ine¢ cient due to the moral hazard
problem. To support this view, we show evidence that main bank client
￿rms in ￿nancial distress retrenched signi￿cantly less than the ￿rms with-
out close bank ties during the period before the ￿nancial deregulation of the
1980s. We also ￿nd that the corporate performance of the main bank client
￿rms improved markedly less after the onset of distress than the downsiz-
ing independent ￿rms. Furthermore, we discover that such di⁄erences in
retrenchment and improvement in corporate performance after the onset
of ￿nancial distress between main bank client ￿rms and independent ￿rms
disappeared in the 1990s.
We then examine whether the decisions of corporate restructuring are
in￿ uenced by capital and ownership structure. We document that ownership
structure, especially the equity ownership by foreign investors, gained im-
portance in corporate restructuring and subsequent operating performance
in the 1990s. We should not overlook that, in spite of being small sharehold-
ers, foreign investors play more signi￿cant roles in corporate governance for
￿nancially distressed ￿rms than the silent majority of large investors such
as ￿nancial institutions and domestic corporate shareholders.
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21Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period
72 ￿rms Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max
Main bank dummy 0.583 - 1 0 1
Bank loan ratio 43.284 16.246 43.285 0 79.667
Leverage ratio 83.794 9.3758 85.703 42.051 99.162
Bank ownership 24.785 15.245 23.895 1.19 59.55
Large shareholders 51.158 14.986 50.055 22.71 83.78
Foreign ownership 1.844 6.0957 0.155 0 34.67
Panel B: The post-deregulation period
112 ￿rms Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max
Main bank dummy 0.419 - 0 0 1
Bank loan ratio 33.172 22.173 31.908 0 97.816
Leverage ratio 63.628 19.170 66.624 11.230 129.081
Bank ownership 33.278 16.840 31.535 1.44 77.98
Large shareholders 47.722 13.754 44.905 24.37 86.62
Foreign ownership 3.422 5.748 1.955 0.01 39.33
1) "Main bank dummy" equals to one if a particular ￿rm is a main bank
client ￿rm and zero otherwise. "Bank loan ratio" is bank loans as a %
of debt. "Leverage ratio" is debt as a % of assets. "Bank ownership"
is the % ratio of bank ownership. "Large shareholders" is the % ratio
of ownership by the 12 largest shareholders. "Foreign ownership" is
the % ratio of ownership by foreign investors.
2) The pre-deregulation covers the period in which the ￿rms become
￿nancially distressed in any year from 1978 to 1984, while the post-
deregulation covers the period in which their ￿nancial distress starts
from 1990 to 1996.
22Table 2. Correlation coe¢ cients
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period
72 ￿rms Main Bank loan Leverage Bank own Large Foreign
Main bank dummy 1
Bank loan ratio 0.092 1
Leverage ratio 0.194 0.212 1
Bank ownership 0.200 0.500 0.043 1
Large shareholders -0.068 -0.269 0.291 -0.549 1
Foreign ownership -0.058 -0.041 0.018 -0.048 0.245 1
Panel B: The post-deregulation period
112 ￿rms Main Bank loan Leverage Bank own Large Foreign
Main bank dummy 1
Bank loan ratio 0.234 1
Leverage ratio 0.381 0.668 1
Bank ownership 0.033 -0.205 -0.054 1
Large shareholders 0.057 0.123 -0.036 -0.667 1
Foreign ownership -0.006 -0.184 -0.128 0.169 0.046 1
1) "Main bank dummy" equals to one if a particular ￿rm is a main bank
client ￿rm and zero otherwise. "Bank loan ratio" is bank loans as a %
of debt. "Leverage ratio" is debt as a % of assets. "Bank ownership"
is the % ratio of bank ownership. "Large shareholders" is the % ratio
of ownership by the 12 largest shareholders."Foreign ownership" is
the % ratio of ownership by foreign investors.
2) The pre-deregulation covers the period in which the ￿rms become
￿nancially distressed in any year from 1978 to 1984, while the post-
deregulation covers the period in which their ￿nancial distress starts
from 1990 to 1996.
23Table 3. Changes in operating performance
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period (t is any year from 1978 to 1984)
Equation 1 t to t+2 Equation 2 t to t+3
Const. 2.3759 Const. 4.0234
(5.92)*** (3.37)***
Chanasset 0.0335 Chanasset 0.0221
(t to t+1) (6.45)*** (t to t+2) (1.18)
Chanemploy -0.0216 Chanemploy -0.0485
(t to t+1) (-0.97) (t to t+2) (-0.94)
Chanlaborcost -1.2660 Chanlaborcost -0.2671
(t to t+1) (-5.16)*** (t to t+2) (3.37)***
Chanoperating -0.1481 Chanoperating -0.1257
(t to t+1) (-2.20)** (t to t+2) (-2.39)**
Pseudo R2 0.1513 Pseudo R2 0.0956
No. of obs. 72 No. of obs. 72
Panel B: The post-deregulation period (t is any year from 1990 to 1996)
Equation 3 t to t+2 Equation 4 t to t+3
Const. 1.7317 Const. 3.1974
(5.14)*** (7.11)***
Chanasset 0.0440 Chanasset 0.0184
(t to t+1) (1.90)* (t to t+2) (0.85)
Chanemploy -0.0373 Chanemploy -0.0640
(t to t+1) (-1.36) (t to t+2) (-1.24)
Chanlaborcost -0.7054 Chanlaborcost -0.2137
(t to t+1) (-4.54)*** (t to t+2) (-1.63)*
Chanoperating -0.4148 Chanoperating -0.3420
(t to t+1) (-3.05)*** (t to t+2) (-3.80)***
Pseudo R2 0.2003 Pseudo R2 0.1557
No. of obs. 111 No. of obs. 111
1) The dependent variable is the change in ordinary income as
a % of the lagged assets. "Chanasset" is the % change in assets.
"Chanemploy" is the % change in the number of employees.
"Chanlaborcost" is the change in labor cost as a % of assets.
"Chanoperating" is the change in operating expenses as a % of sales.
2) Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. Asterisks *, ** and ***
denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
24Table 4-1. Changes in operating performance
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period (t is any year from 1978 to 1984)
t to t+2 t to t+3 t to t+4
All ￿rms (Sample size: 72)
Mean 4.1613*** 6.6859*** 7.0483***
Std.dev. 6.7050 5.8880 6.3731
Median 3.9426*** 5.3805*** 6.0443***
Main bank ￿rms (Sample size: 42)
Mean 3.1014*** 5.7850*** 5.8780***
Std.dev. 3.6736 4.5047 4.2977
Median 2.0215*** 4.9475*** 4.8116***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 30)
Mean 5.6452*** 7.9470*** 8.6868***
Std.dev. 9.3328 7.3053 8.2805
Median 5.6290*** 7.8723*** 8.6933***
Rank-sum test 1.171* 2.074** 2.311***
Panel B: The post-deregulation period (t is any year from 1990 to 1996)
t to t+2 t to t+3 t to t+4
All ￿rms (Sample size: 112)
Mean 2.3731*** 4.5170*** 4.9780***
Std.dev. 3.4273 3.5669 3.9155
Median 2.0465*** 3.5129*** 3.9788***
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 47)
Mean 2.1937*** 3.6853*** 3.9411***
Std.dev. 2.5514 2.5793 2.5753
Median 2.3422*** 2.8904*** 3.3939***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 65)
Mean 2.5028*** 5.1184*** 5.717***
Std.dev. 3.9564 4.0505 4.5253
Median 1.7915*** 3.8646*** 4.7811***
Rank-sum test -0.097 1.624* 2.497***
1) Signi￿cance levels for di⁄erence in median between main bank client
￿rms and independent ￿rms are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Z-
statistics are displayed); those for di⁄erence from zero are based on t-
tests for mean and on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for median.
2) *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. No asterisks mean that the null hypothesis is not rejected.
25Table 4-2. Percentage changes in assets
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period (t is any year from 1978 to 1984)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 72)
Mean 4.4996 2.4796 5.6465*** 7.4331 14.8401**
Std.dev. 36.4713 14.0661 15.9679 41.7885 56.1768
Median -1.0293 1.7517 3.0796*** 1.7226 4.8768
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 42)
Mean -0.6312 1.8198 3.0313 1.0995 3.9841
Std.dev. 10.6688 11.8377 12.1260 14.7874 19.1480
Median -1.0293 1.4546 2.5815 1.3386 1.3742
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 30)
Mean 11.6826 3.4032 9.3078** 16.3002 30.0385*
Std.dev. 54.8103 16.8752 19.8139 61.8610 82.4522
Median -0.5879 3.1706 4.2796*** 4.6753 9.4665**
Rank-sum test 0.137 0.777 1.291 0.560 1.382
Panel B: The post-deregulation period (t is any year from 1990 to 1996)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 112)
Mean -3.2480*** -1.4509* 1.4855** -4.4391*** -2.8279
Std.dev. 10.3956 9.0780 7.8312 15.3157 19.1535
Median -3.6291*** -1.9831*** 0.3894 -5.6014*** -6.1878**
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 47)
Mean -4.2708*** -0.6394 0.6656 -4.8296*** -4.1880**
Std.dev. 5.4908 8.1473 5.1415 10.004 11.3370
Median -4.0460*** -1.6318* 0.5292 -5.0983*** -4.540***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 65)
Mean -2.5084 -2.0376* 2.0783* -4.1567* -1.8443
Std.dev. 12.8234 9.7154 9.3014 18.2948 23.2710
Median -3.5805*** -2.5498** 0.1421 -6.2026*** -6.4722**
Rank-sum test 0.610 -0.404 0.168 -0.198 -0.150
1) Signi￿cance levels for di⁄erence in median between main bank client
￿rms and independent ￿rms are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Z-
statistics are displayed); those for di⁄erence from zero are based on t-
tests for mean and on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for median.
2) *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. No asterisks mean that the null hypothesis is not rejected.
26Table 4-3. Percentage changes in employees
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period (t is any year from 1978 to 1984)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 72)
Mean -7.1029*** -7.9684*** -0.9268 -14.5687*** -14.9990***
Std.dev. 16.6654 13.9039 13.9062 21.7830 22.4134
Median -4.5207*** -4.2489*** -0.7418* -10.8817*** -12.8443***
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 42)
Mean -9.4472*** -6.8589*** 0.5505 -14.8466*** -14.7487***
Std.dev. 10.6396 12.3828 17.0987 14.8148 19.9754
Median -5.0956*** -4.2423*** 0.2415 -11.2432*** -12.8443***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 30)
Mean -5.8209** -9.5217*** -2.9951** -14.2598*** -15.3493***
Std.dev. 22.3793 15.8820 7.2470 29.1095 25.7987
Median -5.6455*** -5.0880*** -2.2718** -12.8130*** -14.1301***
Rank-sum test -0.565 -0.971 -2.364** -0.263 -0.445
Panel B: The post-deregulation period (t is any year from 1990 to 1996)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 112)
Mean -6.1449*** -7.2690*** -4.5697*** -12.9318*** -16.7090***
Std.dev. 9.5365 9.0301 6.4352 12.3598 14.2849
Median -4.5811*** -5.0430*** -3.9031*** -11.6358*** -15.8059***
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 47)
Mean -5.2850*** -6.0822*** -5.2875*** -10.9844*** -15.5083***
Std.dev. 5.4677 9.5065 6.3415 11.0705 13.2823
Median -4.2910*** -5.7039*** -4.5297*** -11.0582*** -15.6983***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 65)
Mean -6.7666*** -8.1273*** -4.0507*** -14.3399*** -17.5771***
Std.dev. 11.6323 8.6422 6.5013 13.1173 15.0097
Median -5.0131*** -4.8929*** -3.1818*** -12.0395*** -16.2347***
Rank-sum test -1.200 0.003 2.208** -1.094 -0.569
1) Signi￿cance levels for di⁄erence in median between main bank client
￿rms and independent ￿rms are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Z-
statistics are displayed); those for di⁄erence from zero are based on t-
tests for mean and on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for median.
2) *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. No asterisks mean that the null hypothesis is not rejected.
27Table 4-4. Changes in labor cost as a percentage of sales
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period (t is any year from 1978 to 1984)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 72)
Mean -0.7784*** -1.0526*** -0.5353** -1.810*** -2.3669***
Std.dev. 1.6110 1.5628 2.0681 2.2652 2.7556
Median -0.4105*** -0.7620*** -0.2364** -1.4027*** -1.6901***
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 42)
Mean -0.7088** -0.6757*** -0.3475* -1.3845*** -1.7321***
Std.dev. 1.5878 0.9918 1.2161 1.9312 2.2093
Median -0.3612*** -0.4701*** -0.0521 -1.0255*** -1.2155***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 30)
Mean -0.7958 -1.5802*** -0.7982 -2.2760*** -2.7748***
Std.dev. 1.6524 2.0237 2.8737 2.6606 3.3219
Median -1.0713** -1.1832*** -0.5043 -1.8221*** -2.0735***
Rank-sum test -1.868* -2.090** -0.662 -2.068** -1.748*
Panel B: The post-deregulation period (t is any year from 1990 to 1996)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 111)
Mean -0.2490 -1.2244*** -0.9372*** -1.4735*** -2.4108***
Std.dev. 2.0489 2.4502 2.0492 2.9081 3.4339
Median -0.0584 -0.7849*** -0.6778*** -0.7900*** -1.6007***
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 47)
Mean -0.2933 -1.0398*** -0.5770*** -1.3325*** -1.9096***
Std.dev. 1.5626 1.7091 1.3612 2.4883 3.0174
Median -0.0084 -0.9999*** -0.5449*** -0.8502*** -1.1863***
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 64)
Mean 0.2166 -1.3604*** -1.2017*** -1.5770*** -2.7788***
Std.dev. 2.3547 2.8819 2.4107 3.1889 3.6900
Median -0.0946 -0.5440*** -0.9190*** -0.7389*** -1.6473***
Rank-sum test -0.101 0.477 -1.194 0.161 -1.074
1) Signi￿cance levels for di⁄erence in median between main bank client
￿rms and independent ￿rms are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Z-
statistics are displayed); those for di⁄erence from zero are based on t-
tests for mean and on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for median.
2) *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. No asterisks mean that the null hypothesis is not rejected.
28Table 4-5. Changes in operating expenses as a percentage of sales
Panel A: The pre-deregulation period (t is any year from 1978 to 1984)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 72)
Mean -0.1718 -0.4226* 0.1464 -0.5945** -0.4480
Std.dev. 1.5654 1.9589 1.9703 2.4750 3.2279
Median -1.8748 -0.0752 0.3438 -0.2595* -0.1495
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 42)
Mean 0.0956 -0.25517 0.4869 -0.1594 0.3275
Std.dev. 1.1053 1.4516 1.9640 1.6857 2.7566
Median 0.1448 -0.0628 0.5130** -0.1133 0.0975
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 30)
Mean -0.5463* -0.6572 -0.3301 -1.2035** -1.5337**
Std.dev. 1.7200 2.5137 1.9099 3.2129 3.5603
Median -0.4705** -0.0980 -0.1101 -0.7910*** -0.5656**
Rank-sum test -2.376** -0.366 -1.542* -2.125*** -2.501**
Panel B: The post-deregulation period (t is any year from 1990 to 1996)
t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
All ￿rms (Sample size: 112)
Mean -0.1875 -1.1521*** -0.8650*** -1.3397*** -2.2047***
Std.dev. 2.4765 2.4112 1.9682 4.0286 4.5220
Median 0.0990*** -0.6961*** -0.6547*** -0.6500*** -1.1737
Main bank client ￿rms (Sample size: 47)
Mean 0.0900 -0.6130*** -0.4573*** -0.5230 -0.9803**
Std.dev. 1.4903 1.3893 1.0514 2.3069 2.5145
Median 0.2706 -0.4719 -0.2579 -0.1887 -0.4078
Independent ￿rms (Sample size: 65)
Mean -0.3882 -1.5420*** -1.1598*** -1.9302*** -3.0900***
Std.dev. 2.9905 2.8858 2.3904 4.8455 5.3873
Median -0.4261 -0.7784 -0.8090 -0.9421 -1.9915
Rank-sum test -1.618* -1.442 -1.406 -1.949* -2.974***
1) Signi￿cance levels for di⁄erence in median between main bank client
￿rms and independent ￿rms are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Z-
statistics are displayed); those for di⁄erence from zero are based on t-
tests for mean and on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for median.
2) *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. No asterisks mean that the null hypothesis is not rejected.
29Table 5-1. Changes in operating performance
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 Equation 8
t to t+2 t to t+3 t to t+2 t to t+3
Const. 8.0300 17.8172 2.9122 8.3696
(1.50) (2.83)*** (1.53) (5.16)***
Mainbank -0.4119 -0.7603 0.6626 -0.1132
(at t-1) (-1.61)* (-1.87)* (1.29) (-0.25)
Bankloan -0.0345 -0.0483 -0.0146 -0.0027
(at t-1) (-0.80) (-0.89) (-1.00) (-0.22)
Leverage -0.0498 -0.0938 -0.0072 -0.0122
(at t-1) (-0.71) (-1.09) (-0.42) (-0.83)
Bankowner -0.0058 -0.0854 -0.0066 -0.0645
(at t-1) (-0.11) (-1.34) (-0.34) (-3.80)***
Large 0.0007 0.0049 -0.0039 -0.0451
(at t-1) (0.01) (0.08) (-0.17) (-2.21)**
Foreignowner 0.0812 -0.0888 0.0799 0.0843
(at t-1) (0.97) (-0.85) (2.31)** (2.52)**
Pseudo R2 0.0447 0.1215 0.055 0.076
No. of obs. 72 72 112 112
1) The dependent variable is the change in ordinary income as
a % of the lagged assets.
2) "Mainbank" is the main bank dummy (1=main bank client ￿rms,
0=independent ￿rms). "Bankloan" is the ratio of bank loans to debt.
"Leverage" is the ratio of debt to assets. "Bankowner" is the
ownership share by banks. "Large" is the ownership share by the
12 largest shareholders. "Foreignowner" is the ownership share
by foreign investors.
3) Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. Asterisks *, ** and ***
denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
4) The pre-deregulation covers the period in which t is any year
from 1978 to 1984, while the post-deregulation covers the period
in which t is any year from 1990 to 1996.
5) Median regressions are conducted to take into account the skewness
of accounting data and the existence of extreme observations.
30Table 5-2. Changes in labor cost as a percentage of sales
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
Equation 9 Equation 10 Equation 11 Equation 12
t to t+1 t to t+2 t to t+1 t to t+2
Const. -1.2433 -5.0914 -0.4325 -4.4532
(-1.22) (-2.13)** (-0.33) (-3.29)***
Mainbank 0.2401 0.5235 -0.1244 -0.4200
(at t-1) (1.78)* (1.93)* (-0.35) (-1.16)
Bankloan 0.0190 0.0247 -0.0011 0.0016
(at t-1) (2.58)** (1.10) (-0.12) (0.16)
Leverage 0.0002 0.0062 0.0097 0.0094
(at t-1) (0.02) (0.19) (0.84) (0.78)
Bankowner -0.0213 0.0096 -0.0008 0.0240
(at t-1) (-2.20) (0.37) (-0.06) (1.74)*
Large 0.0103 0.0280 -0.0017 0.0488
(at t-1) (1.09) (0.90) (-0.10) (2.88)**
Foreignowner -0.0024 -0.0340 -0.0609 -0.0810
(at t-1) (-0.16) (-0.79) (-1.84)* (-1.19)
Pseudo R2 0.0568 0.0972 0.0125 0.026
No. of obs. 72 72 111 111
1) The dependent variable is the change in labor cost as a % of sales.
2) "Mainbank" is the main bank dummy (1=main bank client ￿rms,
0=independent ￿rms). "Bankloan" is the ratio of bank loans to debt.
"Leverage" is the ratio of debt to assets. "Bankowner" is the
ownership share by banks. "Large" is the ownership share by the
12 largest shareholders. "Foreignowner" is the ownership share
by foreign investors.
3) Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. Asterisks *, ** and ***
denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
4) The pre-deregulation covers the period in which t is any year
from 1978 to 1984, while the post-deregulation covers the period
in which t is any year from 1990 to 1996.
5) Median regressions are conducted to take into account the skewness
of accounting data and the existence of extreme observations.
31Table 5-3. Changes in operating expenses as a percentage of sales
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation
Equation 13 Equation 14 Equation 15 Equation 16
t to t+1 t to t+2 t to t+1 t to t+2
Const. -0.8343 -2.3318 -2.2950 -3.8043
(-0.61) (-1.14) (-2.28)** (1.77)*
Mainbank 0.8302 0.5582 0.52013 0.3882
(at t-1) (2.34)** (1.27) (1.88)* (0.64)
Bankloan 0.0205 0.0085 0.0031 0.0007
(at t-1) (1.68)* (0.56) (0.41) (0.05)
Leverage -0.0011 0.0238 0.0176 0.0301
(at t-1) (-0.06) (0.93) (1.97)* (1.49)
Bankowner -0.0208 -0.0161 -0.0062 0.0055
(at t-1) (-1.37) (-0.86) (-0.61) (0.25)
Large -0.0007 -0.0036 0.0196 0.0239
(at t-1) (-0.05) (-0.19) (1.58) (0.89)
Foreignowner 0.0067 -0.0420 -0.0504 -0.0594
(at t-1) (0.28) (-1.39) (-2.75)*** (-1.86)*
Pseudo R2 0.0771 0.0513 0.0934 0.0720
No. of obs. 72 72 112 112
1) The dependent variable is the change in operating expenses as
a % of sales.
2) "Mainbank" is the main bank dummy (1=main bank client ￿rms,
0=independent ￿rms). "Bankloan" is the ratio of bank loans to debt.
"Leverage" is the ratio of debt to assets. "Bankowner" is the
ownership share by banks. "Large" is the ownership share by the
12 largest shareholders. "Foreignowner" is the ownership share
by foreign investors.
3) Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. Asterisks *, ** and ***
denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
4) The pre-deregulation covers the period in which t is any year
from 1978 to 1984, while the post-deregulation covers the period
in which t is any year from 1990 to 1996.
5) Median regressions are conducted to take into account the skewness
of accounting data and the existence of extreme observations.
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